# The United States used about 48,000 tons of rare-earth magnets last year and made 300 of them

China supplies more than 90% of the world's magnets, a Pentagon rule requires defense contractors to source them outside China from January 2027, and China's September chip exports rose 136%.

- Published: 2026-10-19T05:11:01.095Z
- Canonical: https://polylog.news/2026-10-19/the-united-states-used-about-48-000-tons-of-rare-earth-magne
- Publisher: Polylog (Global desk)
- Section: tech
- Sources: [OilPrice](https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/America-Needs-48000-Tons-of-Rare-Earth-Magnets-It-Only-Makes-300.html), [Xinhua](https://english.news.cn/20261018/275af7ad0d984f2f94335c22f2af7ae3/c.html)

The United States needed [roughly 48,000 metric tons of the most common type of rare-earth magnet last year, and domestic sources supplied just 300 tons](https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/America-Needs-48000-Tons-of-Rare-Earth-Magnets-It-Only-Makes-300.html), according to OilPrice. The rest came from abroad. China makes more than 90% of the world's supply. These magnets go into electric motors, wind turbines, guided munitions, drones and the cooling and power systems of data centers.

The gap now has a deadline. The Department of Defense has set [January 2027 as the date by which American defense contractors must source magnets from manufacturers outside China](https://www.metal-powder.tech/?p=283510). MP Materials, the only significant US rare-earth miner and processor, has reported output of about [1,300 tons of the oxide used to make these magnets](https://www.metal-powder.tech/?p=285478), still far below the demand figure. Beijing has shown it will use its position. In April 2025 it put [export controls on magnets and seven medium and heavy rare earths](https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare-earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains).

China's own figures show its technology industry growing on the other side of the export-control divide. Integrated-circuit exports [rose 136% to $45 billion in September](https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/world/20261019/chinas-economy-picks-up-pace-in-q3-as-exports-power-uneven-recovery). Xinhua, the state news agency, ran a feature on Sunday promoting what it called [an "unlikely" AI computing hub inside China](https://english.news.cn/20261018/275af7ad0d984f2f94335c22f2af7ae3/c.html). Beijing has been placing computing clusters in western provinces where electricity is cheap.

The two sides hold different kinds of leverage. Washington controls the most advanced chips and the tools to make them. Beijing controls the processed minerals that turn those chips into weapons, vehicles and powered data centers. China's September export data show that US controls have not stopped Chinese chips from reaching foreign buyers in volume.

## What this means

The mechanism is input dependence. Every US defense program and electric-motor supply chain that uses neodymium magnets depends on a Chinese licensing decision until non-Chinese capacity reaches thousands of tons, not hundreds. US defense primes, automakers and motor makers carry that risk, and so do the data-center builders whose cooling and power equipment uses the same magnets. Non-Chinese magnet makers in Japan, the United States and Australia gain pricing power ahead of the 2027 deadline. The market prices this as a slow industrial-policy story. It underweights how short the timeline is: a 2027 sourcing rule against current US output of 300 tons means contractors will either get waivers or pay sharply higher prices. The precedent is China's 2010 restriction of rare-earth exports to Japan, which drove a price spike and, over about a decade, a costly Japanese effort to diversify supply that cut but did not end its dependence. The likelier outcome is that the Pentagon grants waivers or delays the 2027 deadline in stages over the coming year while it funds new capacity. This depends on non-Chinese capacity staying far below demand. The desk's read is wrong if new US and allied magnet plants announce volumes in the thousands of tons before the deadline.

## What to watch

- Whether the Department of Defense issues waivers or extends the January 2027 magnet deadline. A delay would show that the gap cannot be closed on the current timeline.
- Chinese licensing decisions on magnet exports to US buyers. Any tightening would show Beijing using minerals as its answer to US chip controls.
- Announced production volumes at new magnet plants in the United States, Japan and Australia. Thousands of tons of new capacity would be the first real reduction in China's leverage.