# A Forgotten Router Approval Drained K3 Capital's $3.43 Million Vault as Initia and MORE Markets Count Their Own Losses

The three failures were in a token approval, a liquidation path and a cloud credential, all outside the core contract code that audits usually review.

- Published: 2026-11-21T05:48:08.204Z
- Canonical: https://polylog.news/crypto/2026-11-21/a-forgotten-router-approval-drained-k3-capital-s-3-43-millio
- Publisher: Polylog (Crypto desk)
- Section: crypto
- Sources: [DeFiHackLabs](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/30a110aa689ab6daf1d381d9466296cffd130140), [DeFiHackLabs](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/18c4aaf3549373b3c0f52dd0ed3e298264dbe1a8), [DeFiHackLabs](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/fbf1e4b07077600f04651f1efbfdd89c6242fc08), [Rekt News](https://www.rekt.news/)

**K3 Capital, Ethereum, about $3.43 million.** On November 18, Blockaid flagged an active drain of K3 Capital's sBOLD vault, which holds BOLD, the stablecoin issued by the Liquity V2 lending protocol. Early reports blamed [a self-liquidation in Liquity V2 funded with flash-borrowed wstETH](https://cryptobriefing.com/blockaid-k3-capital-sbold-exploit/). K3's postmortem, based on analysis by the security firm ChainSecurity, gave a different cause. It said the attacker used [an unused 1inch router approval that the vault still held](https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/), and it said neither Liquity V2 nor 1inch was exploited. The loss was about 3.43 million BOLD, nearly all of the vault's assets. K3 paused the vault at 13:05 Coordinated Universal Time, [offered a 15% bounty](https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/11/19/k3-capital-offers-15-bounty-to-recover-3-43m-lost-in-sbold-exploit/) and said it would work with law enforcement. It has not yet counted losses to users who held the vault token through Pendle. DeFiHackLabs published its reproduction of the attack as a ["swap-verification drain"](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/30a110aa689ab6daf1d381d9466296cffd130140), which [it later updated](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/18c4aaf3549373b3c0f52dd0ed3e298264dbe1a8). That label fits K3's account of a flaw in how the vault checked swaps sent through the old approval. No attacker has been identified.

**MORE Markets, Flow's Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) network, about $308,000.** Starting at about 17:30 Coordinated Universal Time on November 16, an attacker used a flash loan to open a position in the market that pairs ankrFLOW (Ankr's liquid staking token for FLOW) with wrapped FLOW (WFLOW). This market runs in e-mode, which allows higher borrowing against closely correlated assets. The attacker then liquidated the position. The protocol's logic [cleared the collateral without settling the matching WFLOW debt](https://panews.io/articles/01a1e6cf-979c-7442-a1b4-418ad865700f), which left WFLOW free to withdraw. Blockaid put the loss at [about $308,000](https://www.tokenpost.com/news/technology/58685). MORE paused the protocol, Ankr suspended ankrFLOW, and the Flow Foundation said the core network was not affected. This is MORE's second loss through the same pairing. On August 31, Blockaid reported that an attacker used the Ankr token and e-mode to [drain about $9.3 million in WFLOW](https://cointelegraph.com/news/more-markets-lending-reserve-drained-93m). DeFiHackLabs has [published a reproduction](https://github.com/SunWeb3Sec/DeFiHackLabs/commit/fbf1e4b07077600f04651f1efbfdd89c6242fc08) of the November attack.

**Initia, about $3.27 million.** Initia, a layer-1 network that hosts its own rollups, said an attacker got into its infrastructure on November 9 through command injection. The attacker used [a compromised Google Cloud key that Initia used to provision private nodes](https://cointelegraph.com/news/initia-second-crypto-exploit-three-weeks). With that access, the attacker approved forged Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) withdrawals from five rollups. About $3.27 million moved, and Initia says about $2.16 million is now frozen. The chain has been halted since November 10. Three weeks earlier, a bug in the script cache of Initia's MoveVM let an attacker mint tokens and [take about $2.7 million](https://cryptoticker.io/en/initia-cloud-key-exploit/). Initia says a patch is under audit, and [Rekt News](https://www.rekt.news/) has written up both incidents. Separately, the Polygon real estate tokenization platform Reental reported [a loss of about $454,000](https://crypto.news/k3-capital-reental-defi-exploits-3-88-million/) on the same day as the K3 drain, without giving a cause.

## What this means

These losses came from privileges that protocols had granted and then forgotten, a router approval, a liquidation path, a cloud key, exposing vault curators and appchains whose audits stop at contract code. Expect curated vaults to revoke old approvals and publish operational audits within months, a pattern a run of code-only exploits would contradict.

## What to watch

- Whether K3 recovers funds through its 15% bounty. A return would suggest an opportunistic attacker, while silence and laundering would point to an organized group.
- The terms Initia sets for restarting its chain and releasing the frozen $2.16 million. These will show who can override settlement on a network that calls itself decentralized.
- Whether other Aave-style lending forks that list liquid staking tokens in e-mode check their liquidation accounting. MORE has now lost funds twice through the same feature.
