# Chainflip halts its network after a validly signed withdrawal empties its Ethereum vault and takes about 122 bitcoin

The signature passed every check, so investigators are looking at the shared key that Chainflip's validators control rather than at a flaw in the contract, and Chainflip has offered the attacker a 10% bounty that expires on November 23.

- Published: 2026-11-22T05:39:39.361Z
- Canonical: https://polylog.news/crypto/2026-11-22/chainflip-halts-its-network-after-a-validly-signed-withdrawa
- Publisher: Polylog (Crypto desk)
- Section: crypto
- Sources: [CoinDesk](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/11/21/cross-chain-protocol-chainflip-s-flip-tanks-30-after-suspected-usd4-86-million-vault-drain), [crypto.news](https://crypto.news/chainflip-ethereum-vault-loss/), [The Block](https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2026-11-21-chainflips-flip-drops-34-after-attacker-drains-4-86-million-from-vault-with-suspected-key-compromise-444804), [shattered.io](https://shattered.io/chainflip-ethereum-vault-drain-4-86-million-one-valid-signature-bridge-security/), [KuCoin News](https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/chainflip-offers-10-bounty-for-return-of-stolen-bitcoin)

Chainflip runs a cross-chain swap protocol. Its validators jointly control vaults on several blockchains. On November 21 it lost an estimated $4.86 million from its Ethereum vault, [according to the blockchain trackers Onchain Lens and AMLBot](https://crypto.news/chainflip-ethereum-vault-loss/). One transaction withdrew 520.2 ether, about 3.25 million USD Coin (USDC) and about 758,000 Tether (USDT). The FLIP token fell between about 29% and 34%, depending on the outlet. [CoinDesk](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/11/21/cross-chain-protocol-chainflip-s-flip-tanks-30-after-suspected-usd4-86-million-vault-drain) put the drop at about 30%, [The Block](https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2026-11-21-chainflips-flip-drops-34-after-attacker-drains-4-86-million-from-vault-with-suspected-key-compromise-444804) at 34% and [Crypto Times](https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/11/21/flip-token-slides-29-after-chainflip-reports-potential-vault-exploit/) at 29%.

The withdrawal carried a valid signature from the vault's aggregate key, the single key that the whole validator set signs with. [Onchain Lens said](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/11/21/cross-chain-protocol-chainflip-s-flip-tanks-30-after-suspected-usd4-86-million-vault-drain) this points to a compromise of the key validators use to approve vault payouts. The security firm Decurity found that the public key verified normally, [The Block reported](https://www.theblock.co/news/defi/2026-11-21-chainflips-flip-drops-34-after-attacker-drains-4-86-million-from-vault-with-suspected-key-compromise-444804), so the contract behaved as written. Chainflip uses a threshold signature scheme (TSS). No single validator holds the whole key, and 100 of 150 validators must take part to sign. A valid signature therefore means one of two things. Either someone obtained enough key shares, or the process that generates or uses the key leaked it. Chainflip [has not published a root-cause report](https://dev.to/pandasecurity/chainflip-vault-drain-valid-aggregate-key-signature-3dij).

The loss is larger than the Ethereum vault alone. Chainflip sent the attacker an on-chain message that lists [122.86 bitcoin alongside the ether and stablecoins](https://shattered.io/chainflip-ethereum-vault-drain-4-86-million-one-valid-signature-bridge-security/). The message offers a 10% bounty if 90% of the funds come back by 18:38 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on November 23. Chainflip also says it has filed a police report and holds identifying information on the validators and servers involved, [according to KuCoin News](https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/chainflip-offers-10-bounty-for-return-of-stolen-bitcoin). [COINOTAG called the bitcoin loss a second exploit](https://en.coinotag.com/chainflip-10-percent-bounty-122-bitcoin-vault-drain), and the second incident at the protocol in about ten weeks. Other analysts treat the bitcoin and the Ethereum vault as one incident. Chainflip has not published an official dollar total.

The attacker sent 2,909 ether into the Tornado Cash mixer, [Crypto Briefing reported](https://cryptobriefing.com/chainflip-exploit-4-86-million-tornado-cash/). That is far more than the 520 ether taken from the vault, which suggests the stablecoins were swapped into ether before Circle or Tether could freeze them. Chainflip has switched on its full safe mode, which disables deposits, withdrawals, swaps and quoting. Users with swaps already in progress and liquidity providers cannot get their funds out until the network restarts.

This is not the first time Chainflip has appeared in a hack. Earlier this month the attacker behind the Premia exploit on Arbitrum [used Chainflip and NEAR Intents to convert stolen funds into bitcoin](https://crypto.news/premia-labs-464k-arbitrum-exploit-chainflip-near-intents/). Chainflip has been both a laundering route and a victim within the same month. The design question is operational. A set of 150 validators is decentralized only if their key shares sit on independent machines run by independent operators. The on-chain record cannot show whether that was true.

## What this means

Chainflip's security depends on 100 of 150 validators holding key shares independently, and a valid aggregate signature shows that assumption failed in operations, exposing liquidity providers and FLIP holders. The likelier outcome is weeks of halted swaps and a post-mortem tracing key-share custody, and a root cause in contract code would contradict that reading.

## What to watch

- Whether Chainflip's post-mortem names how the key or its shares were obtained. A finding of shared hosting or a shared operator would push other threshold-signature bridges to rotate keys and review who runs their signers.
- Whether the attacker returns 90% of the funds before the November 23 deadline. A return would make this a negotiated recovery, while silence means more Tornado Cash withdrawals and a law-enforcement chase.
- How Chainflip restarts. A smaller or reshuffled validator set, or a new key generation, would show that the team found the fault in who held the key shares.
